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ABSTRACT	  
This paper proposes an explanation of the cognitive change that occurs as the 
creative process proceeds. During the initial, intuitive phase, each thought activates, 
and potentially retrieves information from, a large region containing many memory 
locations. Because of the distributed, content-addressable structure of memory, the 
diverse contents of these many locations merge to generate the next thought. Novel 
associations often result. As one focuses on an idea, the region searched and 
retrieved from narrows, such that the next thought is the product of fewer memory 
locations. This enables a shift from association-based to causation-based thinking, 
which facilitates the fine-tuning and manifestation of the creative work. 
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INTRODUCTION	  
What happens in the mind as a creative idea takes shape? This paper puts forth a theory 
of the cognitive mechanisms underlying creativity, elaborating on previous work [19, 20] 
to include the cognitive change that occurs as an idea transforms from inspiration to 
finished product. It assumes some form of homomorphism (rather than isomorphism) 
between the physical and the mental. 
STAGES	  OF	  THE	  CREATIVE	  PROCESS	  
The creative process has a long history of being divided into stages [3, 23, 60]. It is 
assumed that prior to the onset of a particular creative act, the creator has acquired the 
tools of the trade. The first stage is known aspreparation, where the creator becomes 
obsessed with the problem, collects relevant data and traditional approaches to it, and 
perhaps attempts, unsuccessfully, to solve it. 
During the second stage, termed incubation, the creator does not actively attempt 
to solve the problem, but unconsciously continues to work on it. 
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In the third stage, illumination, a possible surfaces to consciousness in a vague 
and unpolished form. Subjective and theoretical accounts of this phase of the creative 
process speak of discovering a previously unknown 'bisociation' [33], or underlying order. 
For example, Poincaré [50] claims that creative ideas "reveal unsuspected kinships 
between other facts well known but wrongly believed to be strangers to one another" (p. 
115). The classic example is Kekule's discovery of the ring-shaped structure of the 
benzene molecule via a dream about a serpent biting its tail. 
In the final stage, verification, the idea is worked into a form that can be proven 
and communicated to others. 
Some argue that an incubation period may not be necessary [61], and that the 
creative process can be boiled down to a generative brainstorming stage followed by an 
evaluative focusing stage [9, 10]. Dennett suggests that the generative-evaluative process 
is cyclic; a new product is generated, evaluated, new goals are set, and the cycle is 
repeated. 
COGNITIVE	  MODES:	  ASSOCIATIVE	  AND	  ANALYTIC	  
The existence of two stages of the creative process is consistent with the widely-held 
view that there are two distinct forms of thought [9, 10, 30, 31, 46, 49, 54, 56]. The first 
is a suggestive, intuitive associative mode that reveals remote or subtle connections 
between items that are correlated but not necessarily causally related. This could yield a 
potential solution to a problem, though it may still be in a vague, unpolished form. The 
second form of thought is a focused, evaluative analytic mode, conducive to analyzing 
relationships of cause and effect. In this mode, one could work out the logistics of the 
solution and turn it into a form that is presentable to the world, and compatible with 
related knowledge or artifacts. 
This suggests that creativity requires not just the capacity for both associative and 
analytic modes of thought, but also the ability to adjust the mode of thought to match the 
demands of the problem, and how far along one is in solving it. What cognitive 
mechanisms might underlie this? 
ARCHITECTURE	  OF	  THE	  MIND	  
Before we can piece together the cognitive mechanisms underlying creativity, we must 
briefly look at how episodes of experience, as well abstract items such as concepts, 
attitudes, and stories, are stored in memory. 
Memory	  is	  Sparse	  
The human mind would have to have more memory locations than the number of 
particles in the universe to store all the permutations of sound, colour, and so forth that 
the senses are capable of detecting. Thus, the number of memory locations is much 
smaller than the number of possible experiences. 
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This is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. Every vertex represents a possible 
constellation of stimulus properties that could be present in some experience we might 
have, and stored as an episode in memory. (A property might be something concrete such 
as 'blue' or more abstract such as 'honorable', or it may be something one would be 
unlikely to ever think of or come up with a word for.) Only a fraction of these 
constellations of properties is realized as actual memory locations (those with circles on 
them). The memory is therefore sparse. And in fact, only a fraction of those actually has 
some previous episode stored in them (those with black dots in the center).  
Figure 1. Each vertex represents 
a possible memory location. Each black ring 
represents an actual location in a particular 
memory architecture or mind. The three rings 
with circles inside represent actual locations 
where an item has been stored. Degree of 
whiteness indicates degree of activation by 
current thought or experience. Activation is 
greatest for location k and falls with distance 
from k. In this case, only one location in the 
activated region has had something stored to 
it, and it is only marginally activated, so a 
reminding or retrieval event may or may not 
take place. If many memories had been stored 
in locations near k, they would blend to 
generate the next experience. 
 
Memory	  is	  Distributed	  but	  Distributions	  are	  Constrained	  
If the mind stored each item in just one memory location as a computer does, then in 
order for an experience to evoke a reminding of a previous experience, it would have to 
be identical to that previous experience. And since the space of possible experiences is so 
vast that no two ever are exactly identical, this kind of organization would be somewhat 
useless. 
In neural network models of cognitive processes, this problem can be solved 
by distributing the storage of an item across many memory locations [26, 32, 47, 62]. 
Likewise, each location participates in the storage of many items. However, in a fully 
distributed memory, where each item is stored in every memory location, the stored items 
interfere with one another. (This phenomenon goes by many names: 'crosstalk', 
'superposition catastrophe', 'false memories', 'spurious memories' or 'ghosts' [17, 28, 29, 
59] ). 
The problem can be solved by constraining the distribution region. This is 
illustrated Figure 1; only a portion of the memory region (indicated by the degree of 
whiteness) gets activated. One way of constraining distributions in neural networks is to 
use a radial basis function, or RBF [24, 27, 36, 63]. Each input activates a hypersphere of 
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memory locations, such that activation is maximal at the center k of the RBF and tapers 
off in all directions according to a (usually) Gaussian distribution of width s . 
Both k and s are determined in a training phase. The result is that one part of the network 
can be modified without affecting the capacity of other parts to store other patterns. 
A spiky activation function means that s is small. Therefore only those locations closest 
to k get activated, but they get activated a lot. A flat activation function means that s is 
large. Therefore locations relatively far from k still get activated, but no location 
gets very activated. 
The mind is similarly constructed such that items in memory are distributed 
across assemblies of nerve cells [25, 37] but the distributions are constrained because 
assemblies are limited in size. Thus a given instant of experience activates not 
just one location in memory, nor does it activate every location to an equal degree, but 
activation is distributed across many memory locations, with degree of activation 
decreasing with distance from the most activated one, which we call k. The further a 
memory location is from k, the less activation it not only receives from the current 
stimulus experience but in turn contributes to the next instant of experience, and the more 
likely its contribution is cancelled out by that of other simultaneously activated locations. 
Following the neural network terminology, we say that the degree to which episodes and 
concepts are distributed is determined by the spikiness or flatness of the activation 
function. The flatter the activation function, the more distributed the memory. 
The choice of k does not have to be determined in advance as it is in the neural 
network if memory locations differ in their capacity to detect and respond to different 
features. There is much evidence that this works through temporal coding [1, 6, 7, 8, 14, 
35, 44, 45, 48, 53, 58, for reviews see 11, 51]. As Cariani points out, temporal coding 
drastically simplifies the problem of how the brain coordinates, binds, and integrates 
information. Different features or stimulus dimensions are carried by different 
frequencies like a radio broadcast system, and each memory location is attuned to 
respond to a slightly different frequency, or set of frequencies. Thus, k arises naturally 
due to the differential effect of the stimulus on the various memory locations. The greater 
the number of stimulus frequencies impacting the memory architecture, the greater the 
number of memory locations that respond. 
Memory	  is	  Content	  Addressable	  
Content addressability refers to the fact that there is a systematic relationship between the 
content of an experience (not just as the subject matter, but the qualitative feel of it) and 
the memory locations where it gets stored (and from which material for the next instant of 
experience is evoked). In a computer, this one-to-one correspondence arises naturally 
because each possible input a unique address in memory. Retrieval is thus simply a 
matter of looking at the address in the address register and fetching the item at the 
specified location. The distributed nature of human memory prohibits this, but content 
addressability is still achievable as follows. Memory locations are contained in nerve 
cells called neurons. A given experience induces a chain reaction such that some neurons 
are inhibited and others excited. For an experience to be engraved to a certain memory 
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location, a particular pattern of activation must occur. The 'address' of a memory location 
is thus the pattern(s) of activation that lead it to be affected. 
	  
Associative	  Richness	  
We have looked at three aspects of the architecture of memory: it is sparse, distributed 
(yet distributions are constrained), and content-addressable. In such a memory 
architecture, if the regions where two stored episodes or abstract concepts overlap, it 
means they share one or more common features or properties. The relationship between 
memories and concepts stored in overlapping regions of memory is therefore one 
of correlationrather than causation . Now let us look at why this turns out to be important 
for creativity. 
Martindale [39] has identified a cluster of psychological attributes associated with 
creativity which includes defocused attention [12, 13, 43], and high sensitivity [39, 40], 
including sensitivity to subliminal impressions; that is, stimuli that are perceived but of 
which we are not conscious of having perceived [57]. 
Another characteristic of creative individuals is that they have flat associative 
hierarchies [42]. The steepness of an individual's associative hierarchy is measured 
experimentally by comparing the number of words that individual generates in response 
to stimulus words on a word association test. Those who generate only a few words in 
response to the stimulus have steep associative hierarchies. Those who generate many 
have flatassociative hierarchies. One can also refer to this as associative richness . Thus, 
once such an individual has run out of the more usual associations (e.g . chair in response 
to table), unusual ones ( e.g. elbow in response totable) come to mind. 
The experimental evidence that creativity is associated with not just flat 
associative hierarchies but also defocused attention and heightened sensitivity suggests 
that associative richness stems from a tendency to perceive more of the detail of a 
stimulus or situation. One includes in ones' internal representation of the stimulus 
situation features that are less central to the concept that best categorizes it, features that 
may in fact make it defy straightforward classification as strictly an instance of one 
concept or another. This could be accomplished through a tendency toward a flat 
activation function. Experiences get more widely etched into memory, thus the storage 
regions for episodes and concept overlap more, resulting in greater potential for 
associations to be found amongst them. 
A	  Stream	  of	  Thought	  
Since content addressability ensures that items with related meanings get stored in 
overlapping locations, one naturally retrieves items that are similar or relevant to the 
current experience. As a result, the entire memory does not have to be searched in order 
for, for example, one person to remind you of another. It is because the size of the region 
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of activated memory locations must falls midway between the two possible extremes--not 
distributed and fully distributed--that one can generate a stream of coherent yet 
potentially creative thought. The current thought or experience activates a certain region 
of memory. Episodes or concepts stored in the locations in this region provide the 
'ingredients' for the next thought. This next thought is slightly different, so it activates and 
retrieves from a slightly different region, and so forth, recursively. 
In a state of defocused attention or heightened sensitivity to detail, stimulus 
properties that are less directly relevant to the current goal get encoded in memory. Since 
more features of attended stimuli participate in the process of storing to and evoking from 
memory, more memory locations are activated and participate in the encoding of an 
instant of experience and release of 'ingredients' for the next instant. The more memory 
locations activated, the more they in turn activate, and so on; thus streams of thought tend 
to last longer. So if a stimulus does manage to attract attention, it will tend to be more 
thoroughly assimilated into the matrix of associations that constitutes the worldview, and 
more time is taken to settle into any particular interpretation of it. We refer to this as a 
state of conceptual fluidity. In such a state, new stimuli are less able to compete with 
what has been set in motion by previous stimuli, i.e. the memory network plays a larger 
role in conscious experience. 
Another interesting consequence of a flat activation function is that an episode or 
concept that lies relatively far from the one that best captures the properties of the current 
thought, but that at least lies within the hypersphere of activated memory locations, can 
'pull' the next thought quite far from the one that preceded and evoked it. Thus there is an 
increased probability that one thought will lead in a short period of time to a seemingly 
unrelated thought; consecutive instants are less correlated. So the worldview is penetrated 
more deeply, but also traversed more quickly. 
VARIABLE	  FOCUS	  AS	  THE	  KEY	  TO	  CREATIVITY	  
There is in fact a considerable body of research suggesting that creativity is associated 
with, not just high conceptual fluidity, nor just extraordinary control, but both [2, 15, 16, 
18, 52, 55]. As Feist [16] puts it: "It is not unbridled psychoticism that is most strongly 
associated with creativity, but psychoticism tempered by high ego strength or ego control. 
Paradoxically, creative people appear to be simultaneously very labile and mutable and 
yet can be rather controlled and stable" (p. 288). He notes that, as Barron [2] said over 30 
years ago: "The creative genius may be at once naïve and knowledgeable, being at home 
equally to primitive symbolism and rigorous logic. He is both more primitive and more 
cultured, more destructive and more constructive, occasionally crazier yet adamantly 
saner than the average person" (p. 224). There is also evidence of an association between 
creativity and high variability in physiological measures of arousal such as heart rate [4], 
spontaneous galvanic skin response [38], and EEG alpha amplitude [39, 41]. 
Knowing that creativity is associated with both conceptual fluidity on the one 
hand, and focus or control on the other, puts us in a good position to posit an underlying 
mechanism: the capacity to spontaneously adjust the spikiness of the activation function 
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in response to the situation. Each new instant of thought can touches more or fewer 
memory locations, depending on the nature of the problem, and how far along one is in 
the process of solving it. We can refer to this as the capacity for variable focus. Let us 
now look in more detail at how it could explain what happens during the creative process 
from initial brainstorming stage to fine-tuning of the finished product. 
Brainstorming	  and	  insight	  
Let us now consider what happens in the mind of an artist or scientist who does 
something particularly creative. The first response to a problem, perceived inconsistency, 
or desire to express oneself or generate something asthetically pleasing, may be a rational 
or deductive approach. When this doesn't work, it seems likely that there is a tendency to 
brainstorm; temporarily 'loosen' one's internal model of reality, weaken inter-concept 
relationships so as to allow new insights to more readily percolate through and exert the 
needed revolutionary impact. One becomes receptive to new ways of perceiving the 
world. How might this happen? 
Dennett [10] believes that the generative component of the creative process 
operates randomly. Campbell [5] claims it operates through a process of blind variation. 
He specifically states that by 'blind' he does not mean random, and is emphatic that it is 
not causal, though how it does work he does not say. Nevertheless, the notion that the 
generative stage is not random yet not causal is readily explainable given the attributes of 
memory described above. In a state of defocused attention and heightened sensitivity, 
more features of the stimulus situation or concept under consideration get processed. 
Thus the more memory locations the current instant of experience gets stored to; the 
activation function is flat, as in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of region 
of memory activated and retrieved from 
during the associative stage of creative 
process. Stored items in all the memory 
locations in whitened region will blend to 
generate the next instant of thought.  
 
The flat activation function results in a 
greater likelihood of 'catching' a stored 
episode or concept that isn't usually 
associated with the experience that evoked 
it. The new idea arises in an unpolished 
form; it exists in a state of potentiality, in 
the sense that the newly identified 
relationship could be resolved different 
ways depending on the contexts one encounters, both immediately, and down the road. 
For example, consider the cognitive state of the person who thought up the idea of 
building a snowman. It seems reasonable that this involved thinking of snow not just in 
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terms of its most typical features such as `cold' and `white', but also the less typical 
feature `moldable'. At the instant of inventing snowman there were many ways of 
resolving how to give it a nose. However, perhaps because the inventor happened to have 
a carrot handy, the concept snowman has come to acquire the feature `carrot nose'. 
Thus new ideas arise through a sort of 'conceptual meltdown', in that the details of 
episodes or the meanings of concepts merge or blend into one another more than usual, 
such that they are more readily recombined to give something unique. 
Focusing	  the	  Creative	  Idea	  
In the short run, a wide activation function is conducive to creativity because it provides a 
high probability of 'catching' new combinations of properties by reconstructing unusual 
blends of stored items. But maintaining it indefinitely would be untenable since the 
relationship between one thought and the next can be so remote that a stream of thought 
lacks continuity. Thus, once the overall framework of a unique idea has been painted in 
the broad strokes, one goes from a state of mind that is more likely to simultaneously 
evoke items that are correlated and therefore stored in overlapping memory locations, to a 
state of mind that is more conducive to establishing relationships of causation. This may 
happen by gradually narrowing the region of memory that gets activated, such that fewer 
memory locations are activated, as in Figure 3. Fewer locations release their contents to 
'participate in' the formation of the next though, thus affording one finer control over 
what concepts gets evoked. Thought becomes focused and logical; access to remote 
associations, and the ensuing generation of strange new combinations, would at this point 
be a distraction.  
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of region 
of memory activated and retrieved from 
during the more analytic stage of the creative 
process. The activation function is spiky. 
Through such focusing, one slowly settles 
on a 'draft' of the idea that incorporates 
aspects that are relevant, pleasing, or 
useful, while weeding out aspects that are 
irrelevant, distasteful, or misleading. In 
the process, the idea becomes grounded 
more firmly in consensus reality, so that 
when it is born it is more widely 
understandable and less vulnerable to 
attack. 
MODELING	  THE	  CREATIVE	  PROCESS	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Is it possible to mathematically model the creative process? One big stumbling block is 
that a creative idea often possesses features which are said to be emergent: not true of the 
constituent ideas of which it was composed. For example, the concept snowman has as a 
feature or property 'carrot nose', though neither snow nor man does). Most mathematical 
formalisms are not only incapable of predicting what sorts of features will emerge (or 
disappear) in the conjunctive concept, but they do not even provide a place in the 
formalism for the gain (or loss) of features. This problem stems back to a limitation of the 
mathematics underlying not only representational theories of concepts (as well as 
compositional theories of language) but all classical physical theories. The mathematics 
of classical physics only allows one to describe a composite or joint entity by means of 
the product state space of the state spaces of the two subentities. Thus if X1 is the state 
space of the first subentity, and X2 the state space of the second, the state space of the 
joint entity is the Cartesian product space X1 xX 2. For this reason, classical physical 
theories cannot describe the situation wherein two entities generate a new entity with 
properties not strictly inherited from its constituents. 
One could try to solve the problem ad hoc by starting all over again with a new 
state space each time there appears a state that was not possible given the previous state 
space; for instance, every time a conjunction comes into existence. However, this 
happens every time one generates a sentence that has not been used before, or even uses 
the same sentence in a slightly different context. Another possibility would be to make 
the state space infinitely large to begin with. However, since we hold only a small 
number of items in mind at any one time, this is not a viable solution to the problem of 
describing what happens in cognition. This problem is hinted at by Boden [3], who uses 
the term impossibilist creativity to refer to creative acts that not only explore the existing 
state space but transform that state space; in other words, it involves the spontaneous 
generation of new states with new properties. 
However, this sort of problem is addressed by mathematical formalisms originally 
developed for quantum mechanics, as follows. When quantum entities combine, they do 
not stay separate as classical physical entities tend to do, but enter a state of entanglement. 
If H 1 is the Hilbert space describing first subentity and H 2 the Hilbert space describing 
second, the state space of the joint entity is described by the tensor product of the two 
Hilbert spaces. The tensor product always allows for the emergence of new states--
specifically the entangled states--with new properties. 
Because of the linearity of Hilbert space, the mathematics of pure quantum 
mechanics is too limited to begin to describe how concepts combine in the mind to form 
new ideas. However, this (and other) limitations are overcome using a generalization of 
the pure quantum formalism known as the state context property system, or SCOP 
formalism. This formalism is being used to articulate a theory of creativity by treating 
complex ideas as conjunctions as concepts in the context of one another [21, 22]. 
Whereas the role of context is generally neglected, as we see it, ideas require a context to 
actualize them in a thought or experience. The SCOP formalism enables us to explicitly 
incorporate the context that elicits a reminding of a concept, and the change of state this 
induces in the concept (possibly transforming it into something new and creative) into the 
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formal description of the concept itself. A concept is viewed not as a fixed mental 
representation, but as a source of potentiality which predisposes it to dynamically attract 
context-specific cognitive states (both concrete stimulus experiences and imagined or 
counterfactual situations) into a certain subspace of conceptual space. Interaction with the 
context (the stimulus or situation) causes a concept to `collapse' to an instantiated form of 
it. Thus a concept cannot be described in a context-independent manner (except as a 
superposition of every possible context-driven instantiation of it). In this view, not only 
does a concept give meaning to a stimulus or situation, but the situation evokes meaning 
in the concept, and when more than one is active they evoke meaning in each other. Each 
of the two concepts in a conjunction constitutes a context for the other that `slices 
through' it at a particular angle, thereby mutually actualizing one another's potentiality in 
a specific way. The stimulus situation plays the role of the measurement in physics, 
acting as context that induces a change of the cognitive state from superposition state to 
collapsed state. The collapsed state is more likely to consist of a conjunction of concepts 
for associative than analytic thought because more stimulus or concept properties take 
part in the collapse. As a metaphorical explanatory aid, if concepts were apples, and the 
stimulus a knife, then the qualities of the knife would determine not just which apple to 
slice, but which direction to slice through it. Changing the knife (the context) would 
expose a different face of the apple (elicit a different version of the concept). And if the 
knife were to slash through several apples (concepts) at once, we might end up with a 
new kind of apple (a conjunction). 
SUMMARY	  
We have looked at a cognitive mechanism to explain what happens in the mind during the 
course of the creative process. Until a creative insight has been obtained, one is in an 
intuitive, brainstorming state of mind, and the activation function is wide. The creative 
insight may take many forms: for example, an invention or scientific theory, story or 
myth, a way or moving, acting, or accomplishing something, or a way of portraying 
relationship and emotion artistically. At this point the new idea is still vague and needs to 
come into focus. One reflects on an idea by reflecting it back into the memory with an 
increasingly spiky activation function, seeing what it evokes back into awareness, and 
repeating the process until it comes into focus. By taking what is retrieved from memory 
(which may consist of many items blended together) and feeding the most promising 
properties of this construction back at the memory, seeing what is then retrieved, and so 
forth, certain properties get abstracted. The initially unfocused idea eventually turns into 
one that can solve the problem at hand, account for the inconsistency, or convey the 
desired relations and emotions. 
The mathematical modeling of the creative process is a difficult endeavor, partly 
because the new idea often has properties that were not present in the constituent ideas or 
concepts that went into the making of it. It is possible to use a mathematical formalism 
that was originally devised partly to cope with the problems of context and emergent 
properties in the quantum world. In this model, interaction with a context (the stimulus or 
situation) causes a concept to `collapse' to a possibly new instantiated form of it. The 
collapsed state is more likely to consist of a conjunction of concepts for associative than 
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analytic thought because, due to the flat activation function, more stimulus or concept 
properties take part in the collapse. 
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